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In recent years, foreign banks have achieved an  increasingly important role in many
developing countries.  In Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, foreign-
controlled banks hold over fifty percent of total banking sector assets.  Although foreign bank
penetration is more modest in other developing countries, including many in Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and the Former Soviet Union, it has increased in most countries over the past
decade.  While  foreign  bank  entry  might  improve  financial  intermediation  by  increasing
competition,  improving  stability,  and  enhancing  sector  efficiency,  some  observers  have
suggested that it might also have some adverse effects.  Among other things, opponents argue
that increased foreign bank penetration in developing countries might reduce access to credit,
particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  So far, however, the empirical
evidence on this issue has been ambiguous.
Recent cross-country studies find that entry by foreign banks increases both competition
and banking sector stability, factors that  should benefit all borrowers.  Using an 80-country
sample of developed and developing countries between 1988 and 1995, Claessens et al. (2000)
find that entry by foreign banks reduced both the profitability and expenses of domestic banks.
In line with these results, Barth et al  (2001  c) find that net interest margins and overhead costs
were lower in countries with fewer restrictions on entry into banking, whether for foreign or
domestic banks.  In addition, they also show that major banking crises were less frequent in
countries with fewer limitations on foreign bank entry and ownership.'  Dages et al. (2000) argue
that foreign bank penetration does not necessarily threaten financial sector stability by showing
that foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico exhibited stronger and less volatile loan growth than
2domestic banks between 1994 and 1999. Finally, examining the behavior of U.S. bank claims on
a broad set of countries since the mid-1980s, Goldberg (2001) finds that U.S. banks did not
retrench their lending significantly following period of crises.
Aside from increasing competition and improving stability, there is evidence that foreign
bank entry might also benefit borrowers in developing countries by improving banking sector
efficiency.  In contrast to  studies of foreign bank entry in the United States, several papers on
developing countries have found that foreign banks, which are often from developed countries,
are more efficient than their domestic competitors. 2 Furthermore, studies have found that foreign
banks tend to expand into areas where local profit opportunities are greatest, consistent with the
hypothesis that  foreign investors utilize their know-how and human resources to  restructure
inefficient banks. 3
Despite the benefits associated with greater competition, stability,  and efficiency, opponents
of foreign bank entry argue that this process might still harm small and medium-sized enterprises.
One reason for this is that foreign entrants tend to be large (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2000). Evidence
from the United States indicates that large and organizationally  complex institutions find it difficult
to  lend to  informationally opaque small and medium-sized enterprises. 4 These organizational
diseconomies might explain why a number of studies have found that foreign banks appear to
allocate greater shares of their lending portfolios to  commercial and industrial loans, providing
indirect evidence that foreign banks might be more important in the market for loans to  large
companies.  Goldberg (1992) notes that foreign banks operating in the U.S. held 28.5% of all
commercial and industrial loans, but only 22.6 % of all banking assets. 5 In addition, in a survey of
271 foreign banks operating in the U.S., Cho et al. (1987) find that 56% pointed to trade finance as
a major area of specialization;  44% listed corporate banking; and 31% mentioned foreign exchange
3trading, all services that are likely to benefit large businesses disproportionately. Similarly, for
Argentina in the late 1  990s, Clarke et al. (2000) find that foreign banks devoted about 35% of their
loan portfolios  to manufacturing,  while private domestic banks devoted less than 20% to that sector.
Direct evidence on small business lending in Latin America is largely consistent with the
assertion that foreign banks lend less to small and medium-sized enterprises than to large firms.
Berger et al. (2000) find that small businesses in Argentina were less likely than larger ones to
receive any credit from large banks or from foreign banks. 6 Also analyzing  the case of Argentina,
Escude et al. (2001) find that while foreign banks allocated a smaller share of their lending  portfolio
to SMEs, they granted almost half of the total credit to this sector in the year 2000. Looking at a
larger set of countries, Clarke et al. (2001) find that foreign banks in Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
and Peru generally lent a smaller fraction of their funds to SMEs than similar domestic banks in the
late 1990s. However, they find that other factors might have mitigated this.  First, they find that
differences between foreign and domestic banks were far less pronounced for large banks than they
were for small banks in all four countries. In fact, in two of the four countries,  Chile and Colombia,
their econometric  analysis suggests  that large foreign banks might actually have lent relatively more
to SMEs than large domestic banks after controlling for other factors that affect lending to these
businesses. Further, they find that the growth rate of real lending to SMEs was higher for foreign
banks than for domestic banks in Peru, and was also higher for large foreign banks than large
domestic banks in Argentina and Chile.
The evidence  regarding increased lending to SMEs by large foreign banks found in Clarke
et al.  (2001) might be  explained by recent changes in technology.  Mester (1997) argues that
advances in credit scoring methodologies coupled with enhanced computer power and increased
data availability  might change the nature of small business lending. These factors could  make it less
4necessary for a bank to have a physical presence in all geographic areas in which it lends (Petersen
and Rajan, 2000) and could help large foreign banks to overcome some of the diseconomies and
difficulties in lending to small borrowers.
However, even if foreign banks continue to primarily focus on serving large customers,
foreign entry might still benefit small borrowers. Competition for large customers could displace
some domestic banks, forcing them to seek new market niches such as providing credit to SNIEs.
Consistent with this, Bonin and Abel (2000) find that as foreign bank penetration increased in
Hungary some smaller domestic banks sought new market areas.  Similarly, in a survey of banks
from 78 countries, Jenkins (2000) finds that, 44 percent of those banks that lent to small and rmicro
enterprises indicated that changed market conditions and increased competition in lending to large
7 and medium-sized  enterprises  were the two most important reasons for doing so.
As  illustrated in  the  discussion above,  studies  that  have focused  on  foreign versus
domestic bank behavior (using individual bank balance sheet data) have not provided a defini.tive
answer on the net effect of foreign bank entry on access to credit for small and medium-sized
enterprises.  Isolating  the  effect  of  foreign  bank  entry  on  domestic  banks'  lending  from
macroeconomic changes can be difficult in country case studies, especially since relatively few
commercial banks operate  in  many developing  countries.8  Furthermore, comparable cross-
country data on lending to SMEs is not easily available, especially since small local banks tend
to be important in this area of lending. 9
Rather than relying upon information from bank balance sheets, this paper uses responses
from a  survey of over 4,000 enterprises in 38 developing and transition economies, to  study
whether borrowers'  perceptions  regarding interest  rates  and  access to  long-term  credit  are
5positively associated with the presence of foreign banks.  If the potential advantages of foreign
bank  entry - improved sector efficiency, a  subset of domestic banks forced by  competitive
pressures into new market niches, and new credit scoring technologies - outweigh the general
tendency of large foreign banks to eschew SME lending, borrowers should rate access to credit
(both quantities and  terms) as easier in countries with relatively high  levels of foreign bank
penetration.  Thus, our analysis should help to sort out whether the benefits of foreign bank entry
found in other cross-country studies accrue to all borrowers or only to a lucky subset.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the data used in
this study.  Section III discusses the estimation method.  The empirical results are presented in
section IV.  Section V concludes.
II.  DATA
The  data  used  in  this  paper  come  from  two  main  sources:  the  World  Business
Environment Survey (WBES) and a database on bank regulation and supervision compiled by
Barth et al. (2001b).  These data are supplemented with macroeconomic data from the World
Bank's World Development Indicators.  Table I provides a list of the 38 countries included in the
sample, which is restricted to developing and transition economies.  Table II provides summary
statistics for the main variables used in this analysis.
The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) is a major cross-sectional survey of
industrial and service enterprises conducted in developing and transition countries in 1999 by the
World Bank  and several other  agencies. 10 The  main purpose of  the  WBES is  to  identify
perceived  constraints  on  enterprise  performance  and  growth  in  developing  and  transition
6economies.  The  survey, therefore,  has  a  large number of  questions  on  how taxation  and
regulation, the performance of the financial sector, the institutional environment, and corruption
affect  business operations.  In  contrast, the  survey includes  little information on enterprise
performance.  In particular, it does not collect balance sheets or profit and loss statements from
participating enterprises, although some information on assets, sales, employees, and enterprise
growth is included."  In addition, the survey provides some information on broad sector of
operations, on ownership, on how enterprises financed investment, and on export performance.
The dependent variables in this study capture enterprises'  perceptions about access to
financing from the banking sector.  As part of the WBES, enterprise managers were asked to
assess how problematic  several financing  issues were to  the operation  and  growth of their
business on a four-point scale, with higher numbers indicating greater problems.'2 In this study,
we focus on the two measures most directly related to the formal banking sector - perceptions
about interest rates and access to long-term loans.
Table III shows average ratings provided by enterprises of various types in the sample
countries.  Small enterprises generally rated access to long-term loans and access to non-bank
equity as greater constraints than medium-sized or large enterprises.  However, medium-sized
enterprises generally rated interest rates as a bigger problem than small or large enterprises.  In
addition, state- and foreign-owned enterprises generally rated all three issues as lesser constraints
than private  domestic enterprises.  These findings  are not  entirely surprising.  State-owned
enterprises might have better  access to  government financing and  foreign-owned enterprises,
which in developing countries are often owned by enterprises or individuals from developed
countries, might have access to financing from their home countries.
7One potential concern about perception-related studies is that enterprise managers might
have different perceptions about what constitutes a  'major'  or 'minor'  problem and, therefore,
might rate equivalent obstacles differently.  For example, a pessimistic manager might rate an
obstacle as a 'major'  problem, while a more optimistic manager might rate the same obstacle as
only a 'moderate'  or 'minor'  obstacle.  Since this introduces error into the dependent variable,
this should not have a large effect on results so long as the error is not systematically correlated
with the independent variables (i.e., mismeasurement of a dependent variable can generally be
absorbed by  the  disturbance  term  in  the  regression).'3 However,  if  enterprise managers'
responses are systematically correlated with enterprise or country-level characteristics this could
be a problem. 14 In particular, estimates would be biased if enterprise managers' pessimism were
systematically correlated with the degree of penetration by foreign banks or with other country-
level variables.  Thus, to provide a check on robustness, we also examine enterprise managers'
perceptions about access to non-bank equity.  Although foreign ownership in the banking sector
might have a some small long-term influence on the development and performance of the non-
banking financial sector, the effect should be less pronounced than the impact foreign ownership
has on the banking sector.  If foreign ownership in the banking sector is as strongly related to
perceptions about the non-banking financial sector as the banking sector, this  might suggest
evidence of either systematic bias or omitted variables.
In addition to  questions about perceptions about the effect of financing on enterprise
operations and  growth,  firms  were  also  asked  about  how  they  financed  fixed investment.
Although they were not asked to provide estimates of the value of fixed investment over the
previous  year, they  were  asked  what  proportion  was  financed through  funds from  several
different sources, including commercial banks.  Table IV provides summary statistics for the
8share of investment financed through retained earnings, commercial banks, government subsidies
and loans, and informal sources.  Retained earnings were the most important source of financing
for all types and sizes of enterprises.  Commercial banks were the second most important source
of  financing  for  large  and  medium-sized enterprises  (28.8 and  17.8 percent  of  investment
respectively).  In  contrast, small  enterprises financed  considerably less  investment through
commercial banks  (12.7 percent  of investment) and,  in  fact, on  average financed a  greater
proportion  of  investment  through  informal  sources  such  as  family  and  friends,  ;md
moneylenders.  State-owned enterprises generally financed smaller proportions of investment
through commercial banks (9.4 percent) than other enterprises, relying more on funds from the
government (21.9 percent).  This  might explain why  state-owned enterprises generally saw
financial sector constraints as less problematic than privately owned enterprises (see Table III).
The second major source of data is from a survey of central banks conducted b)  the
World Bank.1 5 Barth et al. (2001b) produced a survey consisting of 175 questions covering
various  aspects of  banking  sector development, which  they sent  to  national regulatory  and
supervisory agencies in both developed and developing countries. They obtained at least partial
responses from 107 countries, mostly between late 1998 and early 2000 (see footnote 7 in Barth
et al., 2001b).  In addition to questions about bank supervision and regulation, they also asked
about the structure of bank ownership, including the share of assets held by banks that are over
50 percent foreign owned, the share of assets in state-owned banks, and the percent of deposits
held by the 5 largest banks.  These are the main banking sector variables from this source used in
the empirical analysis.  In addition to these variables, several variables related to the regulatory
and  supervisory environments are included  in  some  model specifications to  control for  the
quality of bank supervision and restrictions on entry.  It is plausible that restrictions on entry
9might be correlated with foreign bank penetration (e.g., if supervisory authorities use restrictions
on entry to restrict the presence of foreign banks) and with reduced access to credit (e.g., if entry
restrictions reduce domestic competition).  Similarly, the quality of supervision might also affect
both foreign banks' entry decisions and sector performance. To control for this in the empirical
analysis,  two  indices  presented  in  Barth  et  al.  (2001a)  are  included  in  some  model
specifications.'6
Finally, the estimations include controls for the macroeconomic environment in which
firms  operate.  In particular,  we  control  for countries'  GDP  per  capita,  level of  financial
development (as measured by the ratio of M2 to GDP), inflation rate, and average growth rate.
All of these variables come from the World Bank's  World Development Indicators database.
Other things being equal, access to credit could be better and foreign penetration could be higher
in  countries that are more financially developed and have better  growth opportunities.  We
include  the  macro  variables  to  be  able  to  disentangle the  independent  effect  of  foreign
penetration on access to credit.
III.  ECONOMETRIC  METHODOLOGY
Three of the dependent variables used in this analysis - enterprise managers' responses to
questions about whether high interest rates, access to long-term loans, and to non-bank financing
represent obstacles to  enterprise operations and  growth - are limited dependent variables.'7
These variables can take four discrete values, in ascending order, corresponding to no obstacle,
minor obstacle, moderate obstacle and  major obstacle.  Since the responses to  the questions
about perceptions are ordered, but are not actual count data, we estimate this model as an ordered
10response model.  That is, we assume that the enterprise managers' underlying response model
can be described by equation (1) below:
Obstacle,  = AiXi  +f 2Cj+ui  (1)
where  Xij are various  characteristics of  enterprise  i  in  country j  that  affect  the  managers'
perceptions about obstacles to growth, Cj are characteristics of country j that affect the managers'
perceptions and u 1j is a disturbance term.  The manager classifies the obstacle as being in class
'k'  (e.g., a moderate problem) if  ak-l < Obstacle 1j <  Xk, where the ak's  are a series of nuisance
parameters that are estimated along with the coefficient vector (i.e., ,B). It is assumed that the
disturbance term, which  includes differences in  individual managers'  perceptions about wNhat
constitutes a  'major',  'minor',  'moderate'  problem has a normal distribution.  The model is
estimated using standard maximum likelihood estimation.  Positive coefficients on variables
indicate that increases in that variable make enterprise managers more likely to rate the obsiacle
as a greater problem  (i.e., it increases the likelihood that they rate the problem as a 'maior'
problem).
We assume that the share of fixed investment financed through commercial bank loans is
a linear function of enterprise (Xij) and country (Cj) level characteristics, as described in equation
(2).
Financing,  = Axu+ ,2i  + uU  (2)
Since many enterprises did not finance any investment through loans from commercial banks in
the year prior to the WBES, the share of fixed investment financed through commercial bank
11loans is bounded below by zero (and above by 100 percent). The model is therefore estimated as
a standard two-limit Tobit model, assuming that the error term has a normal distribution.
IV.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
Foreign Penetration in the Banking Sector.  Controlling for macroeconomic conditions
and other factors that might explain access to credit, we find that in countries where foreign
penetration in the banking sector was higher (i.e., where foreign banks account for a greater
share of banking sector assets), enterprises financed a greater share of investment through bank
lending (see Table V, column 1).  In addition to being statistically significant at a 10 percent
level, the  impact of  foreign penetration  in  the  banking sector appears  large. In  particular,
increasing the share of bank assets held by foreign-owned banks by 1 percentage point raises the
average share of investment financed through bank lending by 0.27 percentage points.
Consistent with this, enterprises rated high interest rates and access to long-term loans as
lesser obstacles to enterprise operations and growth in countries with a larger degree of foreign
penetration in the banking sector (see Table V, columns 2 and 3).18 In both cases the coefficient
on foreign penetration is statistically significant at a one-percent level or higher.  In contrast,
foreign penetration is not significantly correlated with enterprises' perceptions concerning access
to non-bank financing (see Table V, column 4).  Since we would expect foreign penetration in
the banking sector to impact the non-banking financial sector less than the banking sector, this
provides  some reassurance that the  correlation between foreign penetration and  enterprises'
perceptions about the banking sector is not spurious.
Enterprise Size.  As noted earlier, small (fewer than 50 employees) and medium-sized
enterprises  (between  50  and  200  employees)  in  developing  countries  tended  to  finance
12considerably less investment through the banking sector than large enterprises (more than 200
employees) did (see Table IV).1 9 This remains true even after controlling for other factors that
might affect access to financing.  On average, small and medium-sized enterprises financed 22.1
percentage points and 8.0 percentage points less of their fixed investment through bank loans
than similar large enterprises (see Table V, column 1). In both cases the difference is statistically
significant at least at  the  10 percent  level.  Results  are similar after allowing foreign bank
ownership to affect small, medium-sized, and large enterprises differently (see Table VI, col imn
1), after dropping the controls for enterprise performance (see, Table VII column 1) and after
accounting for differences in bank regulation and supervision (see Table VII, column 4).
Small and medium-sized enterprises also  generally rated high interest rates, access to
long-term loans, and access to non-bank financing as greater constraints on enterprise operations
and growth than large enterprises.  These differences are statistically significant in several cases.
However, there is no clear pattern when comparing small and medium-sized enterprises.  Akfter
controlling for other factors that might affect enterprise performance, medium-sized enterprises
rated high interest rates as a  greater constraint than small (or large) enterprises, while small
enterprises rated access to non-bank financing and long-term loans as greater constraints than
medium enterprises.
Interaction  between Enterprise Size and Foreign Penetration  in the Banking  Sector.
Although on average  enterprises  saw interest  rates and  access to  long-term loans  as  lesser
constraints and financed  greater shares of investment through commercial banks in  countries
where foreign bank penetration was greater, it is still possible that the benefits primarily go to
medium or  large  enterprises.  To  test  whether  this  is  the  case,  interaction terms  between
enterprise size and the extent of foreign bank penetration are included in the regressions in Table
13VI. 20 When we include these interaction terms in the regression for the share of investment
financed through commercial bank loans, the coefficient on foreign penetration is larger for large
enterprises than it is for medium or small enterprises (see Table VI, column  1).  Further, the
coefficient  on  the  interaction  term  for  small  enterprises  is  statistically  insignificant  at
conventional  significance levels.  The  point  estimates of  the coefficients  suggest that  a  1
percentage point increase in foreign bank assets raises the share of investment financed through
commercial bank loans by 0.23, 0.26, and 0.35 percentage points for small, medium, and large
enterprises, respectively.
The results are similar for the measures of the obstacles to  enterprise operations and
growth imposed by  high  interest rates and  access to  long-term financing.  Increased foreign
penetration generally affects the perceptions of small and medium enterprise managers less than
managers of large enterprises.  Increasing foreign bank penetration from  5.1 percent (foreign
bank penetration at the level of the 20th  percentile of countries in the sample) to  50.9 percent
(80th  percentile) decreases the probability that the average enterprise manager would rate interest
rates and access to long-term loans as a  major constraint by 9.6 and 23.7 percentage points,
respectively (see Table VIII).21  However, the impact is smaller for small enterprises (8.1 and
23.6 percentage points respectively) than for large enterprises (12.3 and 25.1 percentage points).
Although these results might suggest that large (and medium-sized) enterprises benefit
more than small enterprises from foreign penetration in the banking sector, it is important to note
two  things.  First, the null hypothesis that  foreign penetration affects all enterprises equally
22 cannot be rejected in any of the three equations.  Second, even if foreign penetration is more
favorable for large enterprises, there is strong evidence that it also benefits small and medium-
sized enterprises.  The empirical results suggest that both small and medium-sized enterprises
14rate access to long-term loans and high interest rates as lesser obstacles and that medium-sized
enterprises finance more investment through commercial bank loans in  countries with higher
levels of foreign penetration.
Other Banking Sector Variables.  In addition to foreign bank penetration, the analysis
includes two extra variables to control for other differences in the structure of banking sectors
across countries: the share of assets in the 5 largest banks, which is used as a proxy for sector
concentration, and the share of assets in state-owned banks.  Concentration might affect lending
if it affects the level of competition in the banking sector.  For example, banks in concentrated
markets might find it easier to collude, raising interest rates, and restricting access to long-term
loans, or large banks might have different lending strategies from smaller banks.  Similarly,
state-owned banks might also behave differently than private banks. 23
In all regressions, the coefficients on government ownership are statistically insignificant.
The coefficients on sector concentration are statistically significant and positive in the regression
for enterprises' perceptions about access to long-term loans, suggesting that concentration tends
to make access to such financing more difficult.  Increasing the share of assets in the five largest
banks from the value for the 20th percentile (51.2 percent) to the value for the 80th percentile
(81.2 percent) raises the estimated average probability that an enterprise would rate access to
long-term loans as a major problem from 29.7 percent to 46.3 percent (see Table IX). 24
Also consistent with the observation that increased concentration makes access to long-
term loans more difficult, the  coefficient on  concentration is negative  and significant in the
regression for the share of investment financed through commercial bank loans. 25 Based upon
the coefficients in Table V, a one percentage point increase in the share of assets in the 5 largest
15banks would decrease the share of investment financed through commercial bank loans by 0.3
percentage points.  This result, however, is not robust to the exclusion of the two measures of
enterprise performance (see Table VII, Column 1).
Enterprise Characteristics. Both state- and foreign-owned enterprises rated interest rates
and access to long-term loans as lesser constraints than similar private domestic enterprises (see
Table V).  State-owned enterprises also financed smaller shares of  investment through bank
loans than private enterprises (see Table V), even after controlling for other factors that might
affect financing.  A 1 percentage point increase in government ownership reduces the share of
investment  financed through  bank  loans  by  0.3  percentage points.  Although  state-owned
enterprises might finance less investment through bank loans because they find it more difficult
to raise financing from commercial banks, the evidence is also consistent with the possibility that
that state-owned enterprises might rely less on bank loans because they have access to other
sources of financing. As noted earlier, state-owned enterprises financed 21 percent of investment
with government funds (see Table IV).  Consequently, since they have access to state financing,
it is not  surprising that  they rate  interest rates and  access to  long-term loans as less severe
constraints than private enterprises do.
In contrast to state-owned enterprises, foreign-owned enterprises financed higher shares
of  investment through  commercial banks than  private  domestic  enterprises (see  Table  IV),
although the difference becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for other factors (e.g.,
size) that might affect bank borrowing (see Table V).  One plausible reason why foreign-owned
enterprises might rate access to financing and high interest rates as lesser constraints than private
domestic enterprises might be because the former have access to banks in their home countries.
However, domestic enterprises that  have operations  outside of  their  home country did  not
16generally rate interest rates or access to long-term loans as lesser constraints than enterprises that
did not operate outside of their home market (see Table V). 26
Firm  Performance.  As  noted  previously,  the  WBES  does  not  provide  detailed
information on enterprise performance and, therefore, it is difficult to test the  link between
enterprise performance and financing as an obstacle to enterprise operations and growth using
this  data  set.  Although  two of  the  performance-related measures that  are  included in  the
analysis, sales growth and export growth, might be endogenous in the equation for the share of
investment financed through bank  loans (i.e., if access to bank  loans allows  faster growth),
results are similar when  these variables are omitted (compare Table VI and  Table VII).  In
practice, neither of these variables appears to strongly affect perceptions about financing (see
Table V), although enterprises with faster sales growth did finance more investment through
bank loans than similar enterprises that were growing more slowly.  Exporters also tended to
finance more investment through commercial bank  loans.  It is possible that this  is because
exports also serve as a proxy for overall firm performance - several studies have found that
exporters are more efficient than similar non-exporters.27
Macroeconomic  Control Variables.  In addition to the enterprise level controls, several
variables are also included in the estimation to account for macroeconomic factors that might
affect access to loans  or interest rates. 28 In general, the macroeconomic variables have the
expected signs and  are often,  but  not  always,  statistically significant.  Table  IX  provides
estimates of the magnitude of the effect of changes in the macroeconomic variables on enterprise
performance.  Enterprises in countries with higher per capita income report that high interest
rates, access to long-term loans, and access to non-bank equity are lesser constraints than sinmilar
enterprises in countries with lower per capita income (see Table V).  Similarly, enterprises in
17countries that are growing more rapidly also report that all three aspects of financing are lesser
constraints than enterprises in slower growing economies. However, these variables do not have
a statistically significant effect on the share of investment financed through bank loans.
Enterprises in countries with better-developed financial markets, as measured by the ratio
of money and quasi-money to GDP, appear to see all aspects of financing as lesser constraints on
enterprise performance than firms in countries with less developed financial markets (see Table
V).29  However, the coefficients are not always statistically significant. Further, financial market
development also appears to be correlated with the share of investment financed through bank
loans in developing and transition economies.  A I percentage point increase in the ratio of M2
to GDP raises the share of investment financed through bank loans by 0.31 percentage points.
Finally, although enterprises in countries with higher rates of inflation tended to report that high
interest rates were a greater constraint on enterprise operations and growth, they did not indicate
that access to long-term loans was a greater problem than similar enterprises in countries where
inflation was lower.  One slightly anomalous result is that enterprises in countries with high rates
of inflation generally rated access to non-bank financing as a lesser constraint than enterprises in
countries where inflation was lower.  In general, these results are robust to the inclusion of the
interaction terms (see Table VI) and the exclusion of the enterprise performance variables (see
Table VII).
Regulatory  Variables.  The  previous  results  suggest that  enterprises  finance  more
investment through bank loans and feel less constrained by high interest rates and access to long-
term loans in countries with high foreign bank penetration.  However, it is plausible that foreign
bank penetration might be affected by the quality of regulation and supervision or by ease of
entry, which might also affect the perceptions and behavior of enterprises.  For example, foreign
18banks might find  it easier to  enter banking sectors of  countries with relatively liberal entry
requirements.  However,  these same  countries might also  have more  competitive domestic
banking sectors, which might, in turn, lead to favorable financing outcomes for enterprises.  To
control for the possibility that the quality of supervision or entry restrictions might affect aczess
to  loans  or  interest  rates,  one  variable  representing  restrictions  on  entry  and  another  for
supervisory power are added to the base regressions (see Table VII, columns 4-6).  Although the
coefficients on the regulatory variables are sometimes statistically insignificant, it appears that
enterprises tend to finance less investment through bank loans in countries where bank entry is
more  restricted.  Also,  enterprises  rate  access  to  long-term  loans  as  lesser  constraints  on
operations and growth in countries where supervisors have greater power.  The first result would
be consistent with the hypothesis that competition might be greater in countries with fewer entry
restrictions.
Including the  additional  regulatory variables  does not  appear to  affect  other results
greatly, although some of the macroeconomic variables become statistically insignificant.  In
particular, the coefficients on foreign penetration tend to become slightly larger in absolute value
and remain statistically significant for enterprises of all sizes.  One noticeable change is that the
coefficient on concentration becomes statistically significant in the regression for constraints
imposed by high interest rates, in addition to being significant in the regression for constraints
imposed by access to long-term loans.  This provides further evidence that market concentra:ion
in the banking sector might impose a constraint upon enterprises in that country. 30
Cross-Country Analysis.  As a check for robustness, in addition to the enterprise-level
regressions  discussed  above,  we  also  present  results  from  cross-country  regressions  for
enterprises of different sizes.  Since there are very few large enterprises in many countries in our
19sample  - often  fewer  than ten  - medium  and  large enterprises are  pooled together  when
calculating averages. The dependent variables are averaged over all enterprises of that type (e.g.,
small enterprises) in  each country.  These average scores are then regressed on the banking
sector and the macroeconomic variables. 31  Despite the low number of observations, the results
are broadly similar to those from the enterprise level analysis, although significance levels tend
to be lower (Table X).  Both small and medium-sized and large enterprises rated access to long-
term loans as lesser constraints in countries with higher levels of foreign bank penetration.  In
addition, medium and large enterprises rated interest rates as lesser constraints in countries with
higher levels of foreign bank penetration and tended to finance greater proportions of investment
through bank loans.  Although the coefficients on foreign bank penetration in the regressions for
interest rates and percent of investment financed through bank loans have similar signs for small
enterprises, they are statistically insignificant.  The coefficients on the other macro and banking
sector control variables generally have the same signs as in the enterprise-level regressions,
although they are mostly statistically insignificant.
V.  CONCLUSION
Policymakers  in  developing  countries  are  often  concerned  that  even  if  increased
penetration by foreign banks improves sector efficiency, sector stability and  competition, it
might have some harmful side effects.  In particular, it has been suggested that foreign entry
might result in less credit to some sectors of the economy, particularly small and medium-sized
enterprises. Combining responses from a survey of over 4,000 enterprises in 38 developing and
transition economies with data on the degree of foreign bank penetration in those countries, this
paper investigates  the impact of foreign bank entry on enterprises' access to credit.
20Overall, the empirical results strongly support the assertion that foreign bank penetration
improves firrns'  access to  credit.  Enterprises in countries with high  levels of foreign bank
penetration tended to rate interest rates and access to long-term loans as lesser constraints on
enterprise operations and  growth than enterprises in countries with  less foreign penetration.
Further, the benefits of high levels of foreign bank penetration do not appear to accrue only to
large enterprises.  Although some evidence suggests that entry by foreign banks benefits large
enterprises more than small ones, there is strong evidence that even small enterprises benefit in
some ways and there is no evidence that they are harmed by foreign bank entry.
At first sight, this result might seem inconsistent with developing country case studliLes
that find that foreign banks lend smaller shares of their portfolios to small and medium-sized
enterprises than  similar  domestic  banks.  There  are a  number of  reasons  why  this  is  not
necessarily  so.  First,  cross-country  evidence suggests that  increased foreign bank  entry is
associated with lower interest margins and overhead costs.  If improved efficiency results in an
expansion in total lending, the amount of lending to SMEs might increase even if the share of
lending to them falls.  Second, increased foreign bank participation might cause domestic banLks
to modify their behavior.  In particular, foreign competition for larger clients might force exisling
domestic banks to seek new market niches, which could benefit small borrowers in the medium
term.  The findings from this  study are broadly consistent with these explanations: although
small enterprises appear to benefit from higher penetration by foreign banks, large enterprises
appear to gain more.
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25Table I: Countries Included in the Analysis.
Country List
Argentina  Guatemala  Poland
Bangladesh  Honduras  Portugal
Belarus  India  Rumania
Bolivia  Indonesia  Russia
Botswana  Lithuania  Senegal
Brazil  Malawi  Slovenia
Cambodia  Malaysia  South
Chile  Mexico  Thailand
Croatia  Moldova  Trinidad
Czech  Nigeria  Turkey
Egypt  Panama  Venezuela
Estonia  Peru  Zambia
Ghana  Philippines
26Table II: Sample Means for Independent Variables.
Variable  Description  Source  Mean  StaDevar
Foreign Banks
Assets of Foreign Banks  Percent of total in 1999  Barth et al.  25.79  26.41 (200 1)
Banking Sector
Assets of 5 Largest Banks  Percent of total in 1999  Barth et al.  69.19  14.96 (2001)
Assets of State-Owned Banks  Percent of total in 1999  Barth et al.  37.50  24.94)
(2001)
Enterprise Characteristics
Small Enterprise (Fewer than 50  Dummy variable  WBES  0.385  0.487
employees)
Medium Enterprise (Between 50 and 200  Dummy variable  WBES  0.437  0.496
employees)
State Ownership  Percent of state-owned  WBES  8.761  25.713
Foreign Ownership  Percent of foreign-  WBES  11.88  28.9
owned
Sales Growth  1996 to 1998  WBES  14.63  59.26
Exports Growth  1996 to 1998  WBES  4.28  37.78
Enterprise Exports  Percent of sales  WBES  17.09  30.01
Operations outside of home country  Dummy variable  0.161  0.368
Macroeconomic Factors
Per Capita GDP  Natural log in 1998  WDI  8.53  0.74
M2 (Quasi-money and money)  Percent of GDP in 1998  WDI  35.75  23.04
Inflation  n 1998  WDI  18.04  20.7
GDP growth  Average 1996-98  WDI  2.39  3.51
Regional Dummies
Caribbean  Dummy variable  WBES  0.014  0.11  9
Central and Eastern Europe  Dummy variable  WBES  0.286  0.452
Commonwealth of Independent States  Dummy variable  WBES  0.230  0.42
East Asia and China  ummy variable  WBES  0.146  0.353
Latin America  Dummy variable  WBES  0.094  0.292
Middle East and North Africa  Dummy variable  WBES  0.062  0.24]
South Asia  Dummy variable  WBES  0.042  0.200
Sub-Saharan Africa  Dummy variable  WBES  0.125  0.331
Sector of Operations
Manufacturing  Dummy variable  WBES  0.403  0.491
Services  Dummy variable  WBES  0.376  0.484
Other  Dummy variable  WBES  0.033  0.178
Agriculture  Dummy variable  WBES  0.098  0.298
Construction  Pummy variable  WBES  0.091  0.287
Note: WBES indicates The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 02000  The World Bank Group and WDI refers to the
World Bank's World Development Indicators. Averages are calculated for the sample from the regression shown in Column '  of
Table V.
27Table III: Average Financial Sector Constraints by Enterprise Type
State-  Foreign  b  Medium-  b
All  Owned'a Owned'a  Small  Sized b  Largeb
Number of Observations  2948  251  333  1134  1288  526
High Interest Rates  3.32  3.18  3.12  3.26  3.38  3.27
Access to Long-Term Loans  2.65  2.37  2.29  2.71  2.61  2.58
Access to Non-Bank Equity/Partners  2.05  1.95  1.72  2.11  2.08  1.89
Data Source: The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 02000 The World Bank Group
Note:  Averages are calculated using the observations included in regressions in Table V.  Observations are for high interest rates
- fewer observations were available for the other two measures.  Averages are simple averages of ratings given by enterprise
managers in answer to questions such  as: "Using [a four-point scale], can you please tell in tum how problematic are these
different financing issues for the operation and growth of your business."  The scores are as follows: I indicates no obstacle; 2
indicates a minor obstacle; 3 indicates a moderate obstacle; and 4 indicates a major obstacle."
a State- and Foreign-owned implies that over 50 percent of the enterprise is owned by that source. b Small enterprises have fewer
than 50 employees, medium-sized enterprises between 50 and 200, and large enterprises have over 200.
Table IV: Share (%) of Investment Financed through Different Sources by Enterprise Type
State-  Foreign  b  Medium-  b
All  Owned '  Owned a  Small  Sized b  Large
Number of Observations  2221  205  172  890  1020  311
Retained Earnings  52.9  51.4  47.6  53.4  55.1  44.6
Commercial Banks  17.3  9.4  29.6  12.7  17.8  28.8
Government  3.6  21.9  0.2  0.7  5.6  5.6
Informal Sources  7.8  0.9  1.7  15.6  3.0  1.1
Other Sources d  18.4  16.4  21.0  17.7  18.4  20.0
Data Source: The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) C2000 The World Bank Group.
Note:  Average are calculated based on the observations included in regressions in Table V.
a  State- and Foreign-owned implies that over 50 percent of the enterprise is owned by that group. b Small enterprises have fewer
than  50 employees, medium-sized enterprises between 50 and 200, and large enterprises have over 200.  c Informal sources
include family and friends, money lenders, and other traditional or informal sources.  d Other sources include supplier credit,
leasing arrangements, equity and sale of stock, and other unspecified sources.
28Table  V: Effect  of Foreign  Bank Penetration  on Enterprises'  Access  to Financing
Ordered  Ordered  Ordered
Tobit  ~Probit  Probit  Probit
%  of
bstacle  ~~~~~~~~~Investment  Hg  nest  Access to  Access to
Financed  Rts  Long-Term  Non-Bank (High values indicate greater obstacle) thouhBakLoneFnncn
Loans
Number  of Observations  2221  2948  2116  2231
!egi~onal Dummies aYes  _  Yes  Yes  Yes
......  . . . .. . ....... _......_  .. .. . . . . . . . .
Sector  Of  Operations 6Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Foreign  Banks
ssetso  of _Fore_i_g_n  B"ank_s  ,-__,__-____  0.2683*  -0.0060***  ~OO5-3-  -_06.05062-4'
(% of total in 1999)  (1.89)  (-3.63)  (-5.97)  (-1.42)
a  n  k  in  gS..  ........... e  .... ...............  ......  ...........................
Assets  of 5 Largest Banks  -0.3002**  0.0024  0.0  160***  0.0039
(% of total in_1999)  (-1 99)  -(1.04)  (5.3)  _  (1.52)
ssets of State-Owned Banks  0.0840  -0.0010  0.0008  -0.0007
%0oof  total in 1999)  (0.62)  (-0.56)  (0.34)  (-0.39)
...... t.e..........p  .............  . .C....a.  ....... c....te  ris  tic...s....  .... ......... ..  ....  ..-......................... 
Small  Enterprise  -22.1338***  0.0617  0.1825**  0.  1951*
Dummjjy  Variable)  .................. (:4.52)  (0.82)  _199  (2.42)
Medium  Enterprise  -8.0146*  0.1579**  0.0297  0.1688**
Variable) ~  ~  (1. 90)  _(2.41)  .__(0.37)  (2.45)
Sate Ownership  -0.2805***  -0.0036***  -0.0040*** -0.0014
%of  eterriestate-owned)  (-4.44)  (-3.87)  (-3.85)_  (:1.36)-
Foreign  Ownership  0.0135  -0.0026***  -0.0045***  -0.0049***
%oeneprise  foreign-owned)  __  (0.23)  (-.01  (-4.00)..  (-5.17
Sales Growth  0.0360*  -0.0009**  0.0001  0.0004
1996 to 1998)  (1.66)  (-.40)  (0.16)(09)-
Exports  Growth  -0.0022  -0.0002  0.0006  0.00  10
(1996  to 1998)  (-006)  (-0.31)  (082  (1.55)
Enterprise  Exports  0.097  1  -0.00  10  0.0020*  0.0022**
(%_of sales)  (1.87)  (-119)  _  19)(.6
Operations  outside of home country  -5.3026  -0.05  13  0.0020  -0.0335
(Dummy  variable)  (-1.19)  (-075)  (0.02)  (-0.47)
Macroeconomic  Factors
Per  Capita  GDP  1.4546  -0.2684*** -0.4251  ***  -0.3132*  **
- atral  o~g,1998)  (0.27)  (-5.09)  (-4.25)  - (-6.03)
M2  (Quasi-money admoney)  0.3096**  -0.00  13  -0.0047*  -0.0063***
(%of GDP in 1998)-  -(1.98)  -(-067)  (-1.73)  (-2.41)
Inflation  -0.1508  0.0088***  -0.0028  -0.0063***
(1998)  (-1.36)  (.9  -. 7  -. 6
GDP  gowth  0.4960  -0.0530***  -0.0491***  -0.0527***
(Average  between 1996 and 1998)  (0.84)  (-5.42)  (-4.91)  - -5.11)
Log  Likelihood  -5163.3  -3046.4  . -2633.2  -2747.6
Data  Source:  The  World  Business  Environment  Survey  (WBES)  02000  The  World  Bank  Group.
Note:  Regressions  include  dummy  variables  indicating  a region  (Eastemn  Europe;  Formner  Soviet  Union;  Caribbean;  East Asia;
Latin  America;  Middle  East and North Africa;  South  Asia; and Sub-Saharan  Africa)  and b sector  of operations  (manufacturing,
services,  agriculture,  and other). T-statistics  are in parentheses.  **  Sig.  at 1%  level  **  Sig.  at 5% level * Sig.  at 10%  level.
29Table VI: Effect of Foreign Bank Penetration on Enterprise's Access to Financing
Including Interactions Be  teen  Foreign Bank Participation and Enterprise Size
____________________________  Tobit  Ordered Probit' Ordered Probit: Ordered Probit
% of Investment  Access to
Obstacle  Fiacdtruh  High Interest  Access to Long-  NnBI
(High values indicate greater obstacle)  Rates  Term Loans
____  ____  ____  ___  ____  ____  ___  Bank  Loans  _  _  _  _  _  __  Financing
Number  of Observations  2221  2948  2116  2231
fgional  Dummies'  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Sector  oOertosYsYes  Yes  Yes
Foreignl  Banks Assets *Small  Enterprise  -0.2330  -0.0048***  - 0.0144**  -0.0020
Interaction  Term  - _(.3(-2.35)  _  (-4.91)  __  (-092) 
Foreign  Banks Assets  *Medium
Enterprise  0.2625*  -0.0059***  -0.0155***  -0.0027
(Interaction  Term)  (1.66)  (-3.07)  (-541)  (L134)
o5reign  Banks Assets *Large  Enterprise  0.3  526*  -0.0073***  -0.0167***  -0.0,024
Interaction Term)  (1.73)  (-3.14)  (-4.62)  - -. 94)
Banking  Sector-.--
Assets  of 5 Largest Banks  -0.2948*  0.0021  -0.0158***  0.0038
%of  total in 1999)  (-1.94  (09)(.)-(17)_
Assets  ofSae-Owned  Banks  0.0795  -0.0007  0.0009  -0.0007
(%  of total in 1999)  (0.58)  (-0.43)  (0.39)  (-038)
Enterrise Characteristics
Small Enterprise  -19.384***  -0.0021  0.1196  0.1817*
DmyVariable)  --  (-2.93)  (:0.02)  (0.93)  _  (1.73)
edium Enterprise  -5.9763  0.1252  -0.0037  0.  1746*
Dummy  .Variable)  - -1.00)-  -(1.45)  _  (-0.03)  _  (1.93)  -
State Ownership  -0.2837***  -0.0035***  -0.0040-***  -0.00  14
(ofenterprise  state owned)  (-4.47)  --. 8)(-3.83)(-.7
ori  n  Owersi  0.0130  -0.0025***  -0.0044**  -I  0.0049***
%of  enterprise foreign owned)  (0.22)  293(390(517
Sales Growth  0.0361*  -0.0009**~__  0.0001  0.0004
(1996  to 1998  -(1.67)  (-2.41)  (0.16)  (.5
xpo  rt  s _G  r"o  wth  -0.00  14  -0.0002  0.0006  0.00 10
(1996  to 1998  (-0.04)  (-033)(07)1.5
Enterprise  Exports  0.0971*  -0.0009  0.0021*  0.0022**
% of sales)  -(1.87)  (-1.10)  (2.01)  (2.36)
Operations  outside of home country  -5.4 160  -0.05 19  0.005  1  -0.0326
(Dummy variable)  (-1.21)  (-075)  (0.06)  (-0.45)
acroeconomic  Factors
~er  Capita GDP  1  .......  ------- ----  ."460  62i  -0285*  0.4255***  -0.3134***
(atural  Log, 1998)  (0.27)  __  _(-5.09)-.5  -k)--
M2  (Quasi-money and money)  0.2988*  -0.0010  -0.0044  -0.0062**
%ofGDPin  1998)  (1.9~~  ~  ~~~~~~0)  - (0.52)  (-1.61)  (-2.39)
Inflation  -0.1530  0.0089***i'_]  -0.0027  -0.0063***
(1998)  (-1.38)  (5.93)  (-1.52)  (-3.93  _
b6P  got  0.5178  -0.0540***  -0.0499***  -0.0531***
(Average between 1996 and 1998)  (0.88)  (-5.48)  (-4.95)  (-5.12)
Log  Likelihood  5163.1  3045.8  2633.0  2747.5
Data  Source:  The  World  Business  Environment  Survey  (WBES)  02000 The  World  Bank  Group.
Note: Regressions  include  dummy  variables  indicating  a region  (Eastern  Europe;  Former  Soviet  Union;  Caribbean;  East Asia;
Latin America;  Middle  East and North Africa;  South  Asia; and Sub-Saharan  Africa)  and b sector  of operations  (manufacturing,
services,  agriculture,  and other). T-statistics  are in parentheses.  "*'*  Sig.  at 1% level  **  Sig.  at 5% level *  Sig.  at I00'/o  level.
30Table VII: Effect of Foreign Bank Penetration on Enterprise's Access to Financinig
Controlling for Bank Supervisory and Regulatory Variables  ____
(1)  (2)  i  (3)  (4)(5) 
Tobit  .Ordered  Probit  Ordered  Probit  Tobit  :Ordered  Probit  Ordered  Probit
% of Investment,  % of Investment.
Obstacle  Financed  High  Interest  Access to Long-  Financed  High Interest 'A  z-.,ess  to Long-
(High  values  indicate  greater  obstacle)  through  Bank  Rates  Termn  Loans  through  Bank  Rates  T'erm  Loans
Loans  ____  __Loans
Number  of Observations  3040  4065  3039  2099  2807  1985
R!gional  Dummies'  Yes  Yes  Yes  _  Yes  Yes  Yes
Sector  of OperationsbYs  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
....... o..  ....... .. . ---------- ---- n-  -........... Ba n  k  s.  ...........  ...... . .. .....
Foreign  Banks  Assets  *Small  Ent.  0 2095*  -0.0076***  -00102***  0.3666*  -00071**  .0.0150***
(lInteraction  Termn)  - ~  (165)  (-453) 1  (497)  __  (2.13  (2,98)  (...  ..  -4.96)
ForeignBanks Asses*Medlm  Ent.  034**  0.0061***  -00097***  0.3923**  -00083***  -0.6ffg*"
(Interaction Term)  -~~~~~~~~  - (2 82)  ~~(-3.69)  i  ( 461)  _  _(.3)(3.62)  (-5.98)
ForeipnBanks Assets *Large Ent.  0.3215*  -0.0084**  -0019*  0O....  .... 4306*  -00097***  0-0194***
(Interaction  Term)  (1.93)  (-4.13)  (-4.14)  (2.03)  (36)(.2
apnkin  Sector  362(522
Assets  of 5 Largs"t  Baks0.1395  0.0014  0.009i***  -0.3402  0 0057*  0)  0197***
(% of total  in 1999)~.  (1.........  ....... of State-Owned  Banks  0(1.....32)  (0.82  )(.3)(1.63  8)(5!)
ssets ofSaeOndBns02294**  -0.0002  0.0002  0.1710  -00010  0.0009
%  of total in 1999)  . (2.20)  (-012)  1  (0.08)  (1.14)  (-057)  I  (0.33)
B  a  k R g la i n..k  .... .... R  e........gu.....la..ti..on...............  --  ...............  .........  . . .... ........  ... ..
imits on Bank Entry
(Index - high values indicate  more  -5.2160**  0.0201  -0.0394
rstrictions)  (-2.41)  (053(-95
;upervisory Power  1.8786  0.0078  .- 0.0439**
Index -high  value  idcae  rater  power)  _______  ______  1.50)  (0.51)  1  (-2.06)
n  t  r.....  .. . ..  L........  e l....  V  a ri..  a b....le  s  ......  . ...... .......  ---  -------------  ...........  ..... ..  . . ........-........  .....  .......  .............  . ... ..........
5mall Enterprise  -20 2162***  0.0844  0.1351  -23.2786***  0.0326  0.0339
D  my Varia-ble)_  (39  !0)  -(.0-3.3)(2)_  (05
dedium  Enterprise  -10.5415*  0.1112  0.0031  9.6431  0.1358  -0.005
DmyVariable)  --  -207  - (j.48)…  …  003  -1.56)  (.51  . -0.04)  -
StateOwnership  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  02558***  ~~~ 0.0031*  -0.0037***  -0.3243***  -0.0029**  -0.0030***
O/o  of enterprise state owed  (-44)  .. (-354...(3.7)  -4.82)  (9)  - 2.66)
oreipn Ownership  -0.0160  -0.0026***  -0.0041**  -0.0263  -0.0022**  -.  .0038***
.fenterprise  foreign  owned)  (-0 33)  (-354)  - -4.58)  (-0.44)2  329
ales Growth  ~~~~~~~~  ~~~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~0.0377*  -0.0010***  0.0002
1996  to t?98)  - - - - ~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(1.70)  - (-.65)(.8
xports  Growth  ~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~~~-0.0025  -0.0003  0.0005
1996  to  1998)  - . -. 7  -0.52)  (.6
-nteprie Eport  0.372**  0.0012*  0.0015*  0.1097**  -0.0007  0  0024**
%of  sales).(3.06)  (-1.67)  (1.65)  (2.08)  (0.79)(21
Operations  outside  of home country  -256  -0.0929  1  0.0094  -3.8301  -0.0310  0.0056
(Dummy  variable)  (-061)  (-1.60)  (0.14)  (-084)  (-044)  (0.06)
M  acroeconomic  Variables  ...  ...................  .......  ...........
----  -2~~~~~~~~~~5746  - 0l5**  i0  1757  -0.2963  -0.3364***  1).5341*** 
(Natural Log, 1998)  (-065)  (-.4  -1.69(-05  - -(-68(47)
2 (Quasi-money and money)  0.5373***  -0.0012  -0.0051***  0.1057  I  0.0028  -0.0046
'%  of GDP  in  1998)  (4290)-  --.. 6....4  .... (054  (.1)-1.52)-
nflation  ~~~~~~~~0.2153**  0.0079***  -0.0006  -0.4665*  0.0157***  -0.0024
-- 99 -- 8)  -. (.-2...  ....  .22)-  (6.32)  (-0.41)  _  _(-1.81  (7)(-0.71)
3DP growth  0.3883  -0.0515***  -0.0520***  -2.0603  0.0011  -0.0434**
PAverage between  1996 and 1998)  (0.72)  (-5.76)  (-5.70)  (-1.56)  - (0-05)  (-2.03)
Log Likelihood  -7556.5  -4167.8  -3827.0  -4964.0  -2885.5  -2465.2
Data Source: The World Business Environment Survey (WBES) C~2000  The World Bank Group. Note:  Regressions include dummy variables
indicating  region (Eastem Europe; Former Soviet Union; Caribbean; East Asia; Latin America; Middle East and North Africa; South Asia: and
Sub-Saharan Africa) and b sector of operations (manufacturing, services, agriculture, and other).  T-statistics are in parentheses.  **  Sig. at 1%
level  **  Sig. at 5% level  * Sig. at 10% level.
3  1Table VIHI:  Quantifying the Impact of Foreign Bank Penetration on Enterprises' Perceptions
About  Interest  Rates  and Access  to Lng-Term  Loans  _______
Ih  ~Change  between
Assets in Foreign Banks Set At  20th Percentile  Median  8 0t  Percentile  2 0th and 8 0th
____  ___  ___  ____  ___  ___  ____  __  ___  ____  ___  _  _  ____  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  P ercen  tiles
yve.  Estimated P~robabilty.  that EnepieWill  Rate.fHigh  Interest Rates as a Mfajor  Problem
IEnepises  0.647  -0.618  0.551  -0.096
Small  0.632  0.608  0.551  -0.081
Medium  0.669  0.640  0.5  72  -0.097
Large  0.625  0.588  0.502  -0.123
ye. Estimated Pro  bability that EnepieWill  Rate Access to LongTerm  Loans as aM  jrProle
All  Enterprises  0.5 10  0.434  _  0.273  -0.237
Small  0.55 7  0.484  0.321  -0.236
Medium  ~~~~~~~~~~~0.470  0.394  0.23 7  -0.233
Large  0.498  1  0.417  0.247  -0.251
Note:  Estimated probabilities are calculated for each enterprise using the coefficients from Table VI and setting all variables
except for the share of assets in foreign banks at the actual level for that enterprise.  Instead of using the actual value for the share
of assets in foreign banks in the country that the enterprise operates, the calculation sets assets in foreign banks at the level of the
20th percentile, the median level, and the level of the 80th percentile for non-OECD countries.  The probabilities are then averaged
over all enterprises of that type.
Table IX:  Quantifying the Effect of Macroeconomic Factors on Enterprises' Perceptions
About Interest Rates and Access to Loug-Term Loans
I20th  Percentile  Median  80th Percentile
yve.  Estimated Probability that EnterpieWill  RtHghnterest  RtsaaM  joPoble
Assets in 5 largest banks  0.59  _0601  0.6  15 
Assets  in Government  Banks  0.6  70611  0.597
Per  Capita  GDP  0.770630  _  0.566  _
M2  0.61  609  0.600
Inflation  0.559  0.577  0.600
-GDP  growth  0.605  0.569  10.540
ve. Estimated Probability that Enterpie  ilRate  Access tLone-  Term Loans as a Major Problem
Assets in 5 largest banks  0.297  0.370  0.463
Assets in Government Banks  0.3  77  0.3  82  0.393
Per Capita GDP  0.587  0.455  - - 0.355  -
M2  ___0.411  0.391  0.361
Inflation  0.40  400  _0.393
GDP growth  0.384  0.35 1  0.326
Note: Estimated  probabilities  are calculated  for each enterprise  using the coefficients  from Table V and setting all variables  except for the
variable  of interest  at the actual  level for that enterprise. Instead  of using the actual value for the variable  of interest  in the country that the
enterprise  operates,  the calculation  sets assets  held by foreign  banks  at the level of the 20"'  percentile,  the median  level  and the level  of the 80"'
percentile  for non-OECD  countries.  The probabilities  are then  averaged  over  all enterprises.
3  2Table X: Cross-Country Results on Effect of Foreign Bank Penetration on Enterprise Financing
(1)  1  (2)  1  (3)  I  (4)  1  (5)  1  (6)
Medium  and  Large  Enterprises  Small  Enterprises
Ordinarv  Least  Squares
%of  %of
Investment  . Investment.
Obstacle  HiFinanced  High  Accessto  Financed  High  Access to
(High values indicate  through  j  Interest  Long-Term  Interest  Long-Term
greater obstacle)  Rates  Loans  thog  Rates  Loans
Bank  Bank
Loans  . Loans
Number of Observations  29  37  29  29  37  29
Regional Dummies'  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
Foreign Banks
...................  ------ I.........................  ....  .......  ..  . .....  ....  ..........  . ....................  . -.  -.-  ------------  . ...............  . ----.--.-------------  ----  - - ------  - -.-  ----.---.----------------------
Assets of Foreign Banks  0.2596** j.0.0073**  -0.0125*  0.0256  -0.0041  -0.0130*
(% of total in 1999)  (2.14)  . (-2.09)  (-1.84)  (0.24)  j  (-1.55)  j  (-2.02)
Banking  Sector  _  . _  _  ..
Assets  of 5 Largest Banks  -0.1122  0.0030  0.0133  -0.0623  0.0000  0.0119
%oftotal  in 1999)  (-0.88)  (0.60)  (1.70)  (-0.57)  j  (0.01)  j  (1.60)
Assets of State-Owned Banks  0.2580**  0.0009  0.0081  0.0394  -0.0003  -0.0060
% of total in 1999)  (1.91)  (0.22)  (1.03)  (0.34)  (-0.09)  (-0.81)
Macroeconomic Variables
Per Capita GDP  -5.2865  -0.1417  -0.3386  -1.5987  0. 1607*  -0.0447
-tural  Log,  1998)  (-1.08)  j  (-1.76)  (-0.17)
M2 (Quasi-money and
money)  0.2808**  -0.0046  -0.0048  0.2406*  -0.0016  -0.0094
% of GDP  in 1998)  _  (2.13)  (096  (-0.64)  _  (2.11)  i  (-0.44)  '  (-1.32)
Inflation  -0.0530  0.0048  -0.0056  -0.1134  0.0041  -0.0004
1-9-,9-.8), ..  ... - - .........  (-.0.  .........  4).  ..  (1.  27)  (-0.84)  1.14  (1.38)  (-0.07)
GDP growth  i
Average between 1996 and  0.0554  -0.0273  -0.0329  0.3038  j-0.0421**  -0.0343
1998)  (0.08),  (-0.99)  (-0.81)  (0.52)  (-1.98)  (-0.89)
R-Squared  0.71  0.61  0.65  0.69  0.66  0.64
Note:  Regressions  include  dummy  variables  indicating  a region  (Eastern  Europe;  Former  Soviet  Union;  Caribbean;  East Asia;
Latin  America;  Middle  East and North Africa;  South Asia; Sub-Saharan  Africa  and High-income  OECD). T-statistics  are in
parentheses.  ***  Sig.  at 1% level  ** Sig.  at 5% level * Sig.  at 10%  level.
33Endnotes
' Demirguc-Kunt et al. (1999) find a similar result. The measures of limitations on foreign entry and ownership and
of more general entry requirements into banking used in Barth et  al. (2001b) come from the survey of domestic
regulators from 107 countries also used in this paper.
2  Claessens et al. (2000) offer cross-country evidence that domestic banks are relatively inefficient in developing
countries.  Results from several country case studies support these findings.  For example, Barajas et  al. (2000)
compare the performance of foreign and domestic banks in Colombia between 1985 and 1998, finding that foreign-
owned banks, regardless of whether they were originally owned by nationals or not, have fewer non-performing
loans, lower  reserve  requirements, and  are  more productive.  Clarke  et  al.  (2000)  find  similar  performance
advantages for foreign banks operating in Argentina in the late 1990s. These results differ from those for developed
ones where  a  number of  studies have  found that foreign-owned banks are, on  average, less efficient than the
domestic banks.  See, for example, DeYoung and Nolle (1996), Hasan and Hunter (1996), Mahajan et  al. (1996),
Chang et al. (1998), Miller and Parkhe (1999), Parkhe and Miller (1999), and Berger et al. (2000b).
'  Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) model the location choices of  143 banks that had at least one shareholding abroad
across 28 countries.  Their dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if bank i was present in countryj  in 1998.
There are roughly 4000 bank-country observations in their regressions.  They find greater entry where economic
growth is expected to be higher and where the banking sector is less efficient.  With respect to the efficiency of the
host country banking market, they find greater foreign presence where local banks have higher average costs, lower
net interest margins less charge-offs, higher cash flows (signaling an inefficient use of capital), and higher shares of
non-interest income.
4There  is also substantial evidence from the United States that indicates that large, although not necessarily foreign,
banks lend smaller shares of their portfolios to small businesses than smaller banks.  See, for example, Berger and
Udell (1995), Berger et al. (1995), Keeton (1995), Levonian and Soller (1995), Berger and Udell (1996), Peek and
Rosengren (1996), and Strahan and Weston (1996).  This last paper finds a non-linear relationship between small
business lending and bank size.  Small business lending increases rapidly at first as banks become larger, leading to
an  increase in the ratio  of small business loans to assets, but as  banks become  large enough to lend to  large
businesses, they start to do so, causing the share (but not the level) of lending to SMEs to drop.
5 As reported in the American  Banker,  February 27, 1990, p. 18A.
6  Due to data limitations, they measure size of borrowing firms based on their total debt within the system rather
than on assets.  They also run separate Logit models for the probability of receiving a loan from a large bank and the
probability of receiving a loan from a foreign bank. This makes it harder to assess whether it is bank size or foreign
ownership that limits access for small borrowers.  Controlling for size, foreignness may  not be that important a
determinant of access.
7 Given the available data,  which did not include detailed information on cross-regional differences in lending,
Clarke et  al.  (2001) could not  test for competitive displacement effects in the  four  Latin American countries
34included in their study.  However, there is evidence from the U.S. that consolidation may have a strong 'external
effect'  on lending by other banks. In particular, Berger  et al. (1998) and Avery and Samolyk (2000) find that
increased lending to small businesses by other incumbent banks in the same local markets offset much, if not all, of
the negative quantity effects for the actual merger and acquisitions participants in the United States.
s This is true even in many middle-income  countries.  For example, in the late 1990s, there were only 28 commercial
banks in Colombia,  19 commercial banks in Peru, 28  commercial banks in Chile, and  91 commercial banks  in
Argentina (Clarke et al., 2001).
9 We are not aware of any sources that provide detailed data on total lending to SMEs that is comparable across
countries.  One reason why this is difficult is that regulators in different countries often have different reporting
requirements and definitions for loans to SMEs.  For example, in the four country case studies from Latin America
in Clarke et al. (2001), two of the regulators collected data based upon loan size (Argentina and Peru), one required
banks to keep separate records of loans to small businesses (Colombia), and one collected data based upon the total
debt of the business (Chile).
10 The survey was conducted in 70 developing and transition economies and in 9 OECD economies.  The OE'CD
countries are omitted from this analysis, which focuses on developing and transition economies.  Hellman er al.
(2000) provide a more complete description of the survey.
l I Although some effort was made to ensure cross-country comparability, the degree of detail varied greatly betv een
regions.  For example, although data was collected on actual sales, fixed assets, and debts in some regions, olnly
categorical data on the same information was collected in other regions.
12  A score of  I  corresponded to the manager rating that  issue as  'no  obstacle',  2 as a  'minor  obstacle',  3 as a
'moderate obstacle' and 4 as a 'major obstacle'.
13 See, for example, Greene (2000, p. 376).
14 Hellman et al. (2000) assess whether firms in any of 20 transition economies included in the WBES appeared to
systematically over- or under-estimate the  extent of  several (non-financial sector) constraints by looking at the
correlation of perceptions with measurable outcomes and then looking at unexplained residuals.  They concluded
that there was little evidence of any such bias in those countries (p. 8).  They note, however, that their methodology
did not constitute 'a precise statistical test' (p. 7).
" Barth et al. (2001) describe the data on bank regulation and supervision in far greater detail.
16  The two  indices are  described  in Table  I  in Barth  et  al.  (2001).  The variables  are  "Entry  into  Banking
Requirements" and "Official Supervisory Power".  The measure of official supervisory power used in this paper
omits one of  16 components, which asks whether the deposit insurance agency can take legal action against bank
officials (Q8.6), since this variable is unavailable for many of the countries included in this analysis.
17 In particular, managers were asked to respond to questions such as "using [a four-point scale], can you please tell
in turn how problematic are these different financing issues  [high interest rates,  access to long-term  loans, and
access to non-bank financing I for the operation and growth of your business." The scores are as follows: I indicates
no obstacle, 2 indicates a minor obstacle, 3 indicates a moderate obstacle, and 4 indicates a major obstacle.
35Is  Since the  index  increases as  enterprises'  perceptions about the  obstacle imposed by the  various constraints
increase, the negative coefficient on foreign penetration implies that greater foreign penetration is correlated with
improved perceptions.
19 We use these size definitions because these are the definitions provided in the  survey based on number of
employees.  Although greater information on number of employees was available for countries in Eastern Europe,
similar data were not  available in  other regions.  Number of employees seems  a  reasonable way to  compare
enterprises across countries because it  avoids problems related to  accounting differences, exchange rates, and
relative income in different countries.  See footnote 20 for a  discussion of results using a different definition of
enterprise size.
20  In addition to the analysis including dummies and interaction terms based on number of employees, we also
estimated similar regressions including size dummies and  interaction terms based upon dividing the sample of
enterprises into ten groups based on the dollar value of the enterprises' fixed assets. This was the finest division that
we could do - the WBES data for some countries only included categorical data (10 categories) on the value of fixed
assets.  The results were broadly similar to the results here.  In particular, the coefficient on bank assets held by
foreign  banks remained  statistically significant  and  kept the  same  sign in the  three  regressions where  it was
statistically significant in previous regressions.  In the final regression, on access to non-bank equity, the coefficient
remained statistically insignificant.  In most cases (34 out of 36 coefficients), we were unable to reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficient on the interaction term was the same for enterprises of different sizes.
21  Average estimated probabilities are  calculated using the coefficients from columns I  and 2 of Table VI.  All
variables except the variable of interest (in this case assets of foreign banks) are set at their actual level for that
enterprise.  The variable of interest is set at the same level (e.g., the median level for developing countries in the
sample) for all enterprises.  Using these  values, the  estimated  probability that  the  enterprise  would rate  that
constraint as a  'major'  constraint for that level of the  variable of  interest is calculated.  The average estimated
probability is then calculated by averaging over all enterprises of that type.
22  The X2(2) statistic for the  likelihood ratio test that the  coefficients on the  interaction terms are  equal in the
regressions for share  of  investment,  high interest  rates,  and  access to  long-term  loans  are  0.4,  1.2, and  0.4,
respectively.
23  One difference might be that public banks are more likely to finance government expenditures.  For example, in
1990, before the Convertibility plan restricted  lending from  the provincial banks  to finance provincial deficits,
public provincial  banks in Argentina financed over 60 percent of provincial government's deficits (Clarke and Cull,
forthcoming).  Even after  the Convertibility Plan, provincially owned public banks  tended to lend more to the
government and public enterprises than private banks (Clarke and Cull, 1999,  p. 876).
24 See footnote 21 for a description of how estimated average probabilities are calculated.
3625  These results differ somewhat from cross-country evidence in that greater concentration is not closely associated
with banking sector efficiency, financial development, or industrial competition (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2000),
and has little effect on bank profitability and margins (Demirguic-Kunt  and Huizinga, 1999).
26  It is important to note that most foreign-owned enterprises in our sample are large, so the finding that even small
firms benefit from foreign penetration is not driven by their foreign ownership status.
27 See, for example, Aw and Hwang (1995); Bernard and Jensen (1999); Chen and Tang (1998) and Clerides et al.
(1998).
28  In addition to these control variables, regional dummies are included.  The regions are: Eastern Europe; the
Commonwealth of Independent States; the Caribbean; East Asia; Latin America; the Middle East and North Africa;
South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa.
29  In some model specifications rather than including the ratio of money to quasi-money to GDP, we replacecd  this
variable with the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP.  This did not have a large impact on the main results.
In particular, the coefficients on assets held by foreign banks and assets held by the five largest banks remained
significant at similar significance levels (or higher) to those in Table V.
30  rhe market concentration and the restrictions on entry variables are correlated (.28), but not too highly.  The
concentration  measure  is  affected  not  only by  entry  restrictions, but  also  by  general  economic and  banking
conditions and other  aspects of bank  regulation and  supervision such  as  the  stringency of  capital and reserve
requirements. It is not too surprising, therefore, that both variables enter significantly in some regressions.
31  In addition, regional dummies are  included in all regressions.  Results  for access to non-bank financing are
omitted from the tables since foreign bank penetration did not appear to affect access to non-bank financing in the
previous regressions.  In similar cross-country regressions for this variable to the ones presented in Table X, the
coefficient on assets on foreign banks is statistically insignificant for both large and small enterprises.
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